Passive Participation

Esthetic

Entertain-
ment

Educational

Escap...

EPIC

MÅRTEN SPÅNGBERG

4. Mette Edvardsen "Black" (26–27.3 2011)
5. Aron Blom "SAM", Salka Ardal Rosengren & Mikko Hyvönen "Trash Talk" (30.3–1.4 2011)
6. Daniel AlmgrenRecén & Alma Söderberg "Abdikation Nu" (2–3.4 2011)
7. Mette Invartsen & Guillem Mont de Palol "All the way out there…" (9–10.4 2011)
8. Dorte Olesen "The Bad The Good The Ugly" (13–17.4 2011)
9. Anna Källblad, Annette Taranto & Chrichan Larson "À une raison" (14–15.5 2011)
10. DOCH (22~29.5 2011)
11. Krõõt Juurak "Scripted Smalltalk" (27.8 2011)
12. Xavier Le Roy "Le Sacre du Printemps" (26–27.8 2011)
13. The House of Bertha "White Noise" (10–11.9 2011)
14. Amanda Apetrea & Halla Ólafsdóttir "Beauty and the Beast" (23–24.9 2011)
15. Jefta van Dinther, DD Dorvillier, Frédéric Gies "The Blanket Dance" (11–12.10 2011)
16. Björn Säfsten "Display" (14–16.10 2011)
17. Sidney Leoni & Luís Miguel Félix "War of Fictions" (21–22.10 2011)
18. MDT presents a fine selection with Ludvig Daae, Jolika Sudermann, Alma Söderberg, Lisa Östberg & Maria Öhman (11–12.11 2011)
19. Sebastian Lingserius "alt. org" (25–26.11 2011)
20. Andrea Berglund, Filippa Hanzon, Louise Blad & Maria Jennefelt "Middagsbjudningen" (30.11 2011)
21. DOCH Master Students of Choreography Present "The Coming Boogie-Woogie" (8–17.12 2011)
22. Jens Östberg "Pre-study for Hamlet: looking for emotional truth"/ Jared Gradinger & Angela Schubot "What they are instead of" (14–16.3 2012)
23. Oblivia "Entertainment Island 1, 2, 3 — the Trilogy" (30–31.3 2012)
→24. Mårten Spångberg "Epic" (16–21.4 2012)

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
ENTER   CLEAR   *EPIC*

They were standing there, in the middle of the street. A wide one; in other places it would be called a boulevard, but here it was still a street even also when, like right now, it was abandoned, or as one would say, completely empty. Nobody was there, not a single being in sight, it was only the three of them. The two women and the child, and perhaps an accidental animal of sorts. The child's gender was difficult to determine, its dress code some kind of trend or minor fashion, disguising not only personal identity but also general features. The three of them were indeed highly visible, certainly creatures belonging to what we know as humans, but at the same time they were only visible as blobs, as something which contours had been blurred, if you know the drift. Behind them were buildings that were somewhat destroyed, but not properly fucked up. There had been no war here, this was no aftermath of a natural catastrophe, but it was certainly an aftermath of something. Perhaps some kind of foreign entity had passed by and messed up, perhaps the police had experienced a meltdown and started shooting each other, or perhaps the place was just worn down. The air was crisp. Normally one would have thought there would be some smoke or steam pulsating out of some broken pipe. Water running down severs, and something like tumbleweed or an old plastic bag. Nothing in particular appeared to be missing, nor were there any visible additions to the picture. It was all fairly normal.

GARBAGE

It has never been proven that people living in less populated parts of the universe tend towards more religious lifestyles. Demographics don't support belief in that respect; there are ups and down and statistics assist, but there's anyway an unbridgeable gap between religion and belief. However, it has been observed that when living conditions change radically, especially in a so to say traumatic manner, that these are the moments wherein people in generally are most susceptible to religious belief.

Even though she knew they had not been standing there for more than a few minutes, perhaps even less. Just a number of seconds – she had already contemplated two scenarios. First that they might just be the only living beings in a really large area of the world, and secondly, that if that was the case if this moment were the right one to consider religion. But Hello, what kind of religion do you build on three people? Obviously one of them would have to become the leader, the decision maker, and the two others would be followers. Not such an attractive scenario, and it doesn't produce a religion, she thought, and continued her inner conversation: "I'm the weaker of the two of us, but stronger than the child, so far. My only survival, is to step down from leadership of the actual world, and instead devote myself to the spiritual side of life, instead of garbage handling she'd turn her attention on guarding the light.

She repeats the last three words to herself but reaches only halfway, for no particular reason she recollects something she recently read. Concerning smoking, except when it comes to the trivialities of health, appears like a sentence in her head – the fundamental mistake is to focus on what enters the body and how these substances possibly alter the human state. There are certainly interesting observations to be made in regard of this, both on short and long term basis, and it's most definitely a complex affair all in all, but this has little to do with smoking as an activity independently, if we consider it as idle of productive.

Bits and pieces of the continuation of the argument appeared to be missing for a moment, and instead some inner static sort of stuff. Blurry, colours are out of sync smoke might come in different flavours, and this is the second mistake. It might be perfumed in many different ways, but to consider it important that the flavour should provoke something in the smoker is obviously totally misplaced. Whether sweet or sour, bitter or generous, rather than being understood as bringing something into the body, the flavour of smoke is about bringing something from the inside out, something that can best be compared with the ink squirted out by an octopus or squid.

Change is happening by itself. Wait and you will see. How could it be otherwise? But then how can something change not into more of the same, but into something that doesn't support either more or the same? Change does not happen through the use or availability of mirrors. In front of the mirror you make sure you are still you, in front of the mirror the concern is a little bit more this or a little bit less that. Problems, difficulties, issues, are in our world treated as mirrors. In front of problems we assure our identities. These kinds of problems are false

problems, they are not really problems, they just look like them. False problems and mirrors have some-
thing in
common – they make things look alike. Real problems are those that don't appear in the mirror even if
they're there just in front. Real problems aren't like Vampires: they aren't there nor do they remember.
The reason why Vampires are not visible is because they coincide with the mirror. They are mirrors, real
problems... ah, she doesn't know. Or she knows, but she can't manage to gather the energy to come up
with a fitting image. Metaphors are for people that know where their anus is located, she concludes, not
for spiritual leaders.

        Her skin reacts to something. Was it because of her thoughts, did somebody come closer, did
something move, the wind. Signs can be difficult to tell apart when the environment isn't easy to interpret.
She, like most religious leaders, had a passion for generic spaces. Airports are too simple. Simple can be
good but airports are too simple, even though one wonders why there aren't more action movies happening
in airports. 'Perhaps because of security', she reflects. 'I'd like to see a Hollywood action that takes place
entirely in an airport – I would watch it while crossing the Atlantic. Stepping of at LAX with something like
Tom Cruise in a radical fight scene fresh in memory. I'd probably duck behind a bunch of suitcases in order
to avoid 9 mm bullets fired by terrorists or some international conspiracy sponsored by the CIA'. Perhaps if
she were lucky one of the bullets would penetrate her skin, enter her body, damage organs and leave traces
never to be diffused.

        Smoking is not about intoxicating oneself; on the contrary, it is a matter of either seducing or
killing the world. The productivity of smoking is a matter of devouring other entities and even entire contexts.
Smoking in this sense is a negative production that detaches itself from the protective or stabilizing capacities
of an army. Smoking, and the exhalation of grey matter, implies a production of death.

30.

        It is not death, it is the production of death, but it is a production of death as such. As a
productive force it is to an extent strategic and temporary...but smoking can't be said to be a strategic
environment but must be understood as a structural plane. It kills without discernment, and it kills in order
to devour.

        The smoker exhales formations in order to dislocate the victim; the slowly blown smoke is
a kind of détournement, a celebration of death before it arrives. Examples of the seductive capacities of
smoking, the exhalation and body language, can be seen in endless American movies. The female char-
acter expresses independence through smoking, the cigarette becomes an emancipatory gesture, and at
the same time it lures the scopophilic gaze into a cul-de-sac. The smoker and the exhalation so to say,
blinds the victim twice after which it devours it without mercy, without hesitation but whilst swallowing it as
a whole. The smoker has nothing to do with snakes or reptiles, remember the squid. It is on this thresh-
old that we should concentrate, the site where seduction and death exits the body and where the victim's
death enters. This is the site of the insurrection; the smoker is not an individual open for revolution yes or
no, but is in a state of constant insurrection.

        Mirrors are the decline of problems. The Christian god was wrong, it is not you should make no
images of me... it should be you should have no mirrors but me. But as we know, monotheistic belief sys-
tems keep themselves with the tacky, yet necessary notion that God created the human in his own image.
Mirrors in that sense are religious artefacts, it is in mirrors that we are reminded that we are just an image
that God created: that we are false problems, small difficulties. Or instead we can take our job serious and
consider the possibility of becoming invisible. Smoking is not an easy task if one's ambition is to break the
spell of the mirror.

        She placed herself outside herself, like people had done ever since Descartes, and considered the
situation. From her outside position she scanned the environment after reflective surfaces. In a more perfect
world, people would have no fetishes. At least not objects but perhaps textures, reflective surfaces. There was
nothing here to reflect her image and she wanted it like that. She wondered what it would be like to touch

a skin that corresponded to this very moment, an extension without reflection. The skin soft, not warm but yet her body reacted — no there were no fantasies. An erotic experience without projections.

It is in the threshold between life and death, between experience and projection between out and in, that smoking creates understanding. Smoking doesn't offer it, it creates understanding. Smoking is a radical state of knowledge production exactly because it operates in the very crack where life and death become one. The smoke is a gift that burdens. The desire created by smoking is not the simple one of chemical addiction, it is the desire to seduce, kill and devour. The use produces extended desire yet does not escalate to other forms of action. Smoking does kill, but it is not the smoker it kills; it is the one next to, the one adjacent. And the smoker feels no guilt, has no second thought, there is no decision to make.

She took of her panties, and it struck her — not in a surprising way but still — that if reflections had been a colour, generally speaking, it would be yellow. Yellow, that precise colour of 3M Post-it paper. A dull type yellow type colour, she concluded and then she didn't think about it any longer because another thought appeared. Consider that that which had happened was not only that all other people had vanished, disappeared, been swallowed by the earth, but that what had gone were also reflections. From now on there were no more reflective surfaces, only matt stuff, like the skin of a tree, tongues, or a woollen sweater. Like in Norway she was thinking, but obviously she had no idea because she had never been in Norway, not even seen a documentary on television about it. But she knew that a life without reflections would be an unlife, it would not be like being dead or anything, it would be like not having been born, or better still, not even that, more like being immortal in reverse.

Smoking saves nobody, it kills for the one that pays the best and changes side without consideration. Smoking betrays all sides.

Yet, the threshold between exhalation and death is only the site of an insurrection, what is more interesting to consider here is to reverse the directionality and consider the exhalation as a double disguise, a hyper-camouflage where smoking can be understood as a movement in which the mouth exposes itself as an anus, or where the entrance and exit of the body become one and the same. This turning towards each other, this turn away from the yardstick and turning towards the compass, the circular the O, this endlessness that remains alien [operating outside difference], this superimposition of the organs implies a formation of endless desire production, the smoker lives in an endless circular formation of orgasm. An orgasm where the oral, the genital and anal coincide, where the corpse of the seduced victim enters the body and simultaneously exits it from the same cavity. This state of ultimate orgasmic production makes the individual both nobody and everyone, it enters a state without subjectivity, it enters the permanence of a plane of consistency.

The state of endless orgasm makes the smoker one with everything. The smoker withdraws from subjectivity, it withdraws from ways of being human known to us. The smoker smoking exits the performativity of the possible in favour of the endlessness of potentiality, and it is precisely there that smoking forms itself as both true to the universe and as a form of Nigredo, a shining darkness without boundaries, without connections, a non-relational formation of world. Smoking in this sense does not only imply a state of endless orgasm but also the immanence of catastrophe.

EPIC #3

1 prolog
2 smoke cloud heads:
3 the sonics : r m l s M
4 statues: z u s r e l
5a oranges: s
5b ballet: e l
5c picnic dance: z u
6 egg hands: r
7 tantra: All
8 forks: z l
8 pan: s
9 tai chi: z s u (a m arms)
9 hot plate: r
9 thumbs: e l - when tai chi started
10 pansmoke: s
11 egg hands glitter: r j
12 clutter: a l
12 compasses: m
•40min postman bell
12 flowers: s
12 dan graham: u e
13 hangout dance: a l m s
13 hammers: r
14 compasses: m
14 corkscrew: l
14 police hands: s r e u z
(fruit sandwiches)
14 polaroid: a m
14 egg hands: a
15 walking: z r
16 (---17 nothing + golden globe: M)
18 hd sound
18 eagle painting: l u
18 drug dealer: e l
19 uri dance 25 min: u
40 min bell: j
20 concert 35 min: All
21 3 new constellations: z a shrimp-harp r s fish-harp e l
bridge-harp + upstage tai chi: m a
21 flowers: j
22 stones: r l z e u
23 paris shawls: l
24 halprin: z l
25 coffe: u
26 octopus dance: j m
27 nothing hangout dance vague
28 steel brush: a z upstage
28 three glass: s
29 the wall: All
30 curtain glitter: l r
31 the literal: s e z
32 firework parade: s + All
33 agon: u e r
34 glitter spray: r j
35 blackout green paint
36 trombones: r e s
36 image dance: z M
36 bath salt: r
37 ted shaw: l s
37 water color 2: z
38 cobalca: u
39 the knifes: j m
40 police hands part 2: r M s
41 levitation: z r u j
41 energy projection: s r e

In the first chapter of his major doctoral thesis, *Difference and Repetition*, Gilles Deleuze draws an intriguing, albeit abstruse, connection between cruelty and difference or determination *as such*. In doing so, he pronounces determination *as such* or difference cruel and even irredeemably monstrous. The main undertaking of this essay is to show how the equation of determination-as-cruelty has a role more consequential than its auxiliary function in reclaiming difference in itself and "rescuing difference from its maledictory state."[1] We shall argue that, on the one hand, such an equation reveals the vistas of an intricate metaphysics wherein ontology is inherently problematic or cruel and, on the other, it brings about an ethical opportunity in regard to the problematic determination of ontology as an elaborate system of cruelty. It is in drawing such a connection between difference and cruelty that Deleuze assigns himself a critical task which consists of reinvestigating metaphysics not only through a philosophy of difference but also a philosophy of cruelty. Yet the recapitulation of metaphysics in general and ontology in particular through a philosophy of cruelty requires, first of all, an intermediating level of analysis comprising three lines of inquiry. The first line of inquiry includes an investigation in order to learn what constitutes determination as such and where this determination can be found in its most naked and rigorous form. Second, we need to know the definition of such cruelty which is embedded in the constitution of metaphysics in general and ontology in particular. The third line includes a search for a plane of examination or an analytical model capable of intermediating between cruelty and metaphysics/ontology, a model capable of

reza negarestani

DIFFERENTIAL CRUELTY
a critique of ontological reason in light of the philosophy of cruelty

recapturing metaphysical necessities and ontological relations in terms of determination qua cruelty. It is the possibility of re-examining ontology in the light of the philosophy of cruelty that this essay attempts to investigate. By pursuing the aforementioned lines of inquiry, we shall ultimately argue that the question of ontology heralds the dawn of the philosophy of cruelty, which assumes a crucial task in regard to bridging that philosophy with a speculative ethics. The task of the philosophy of cruelty, in this sense, is to become the harbinger of enlightenment for the ethics of being and remobilizing ontology in the shadow of its cruelty.

act i: elements of cruelty

What constitutes the act of determination as such? Is it merely a unidirectional escape from gravity? Or is it a flight from gravity by coming into a collusive stance with it? The act of determination whose line of movement is that of unilateral distinction, Deleuze argues, distinguishes X from its chaotic background to *make a difference*. Yet what is this indeterminable background? Deleuze identifies it in terms of two realms of nothingness, black and white. Whilst the former is the void of absolute indifference, the latter is the domain of unconnected parts, determinate things which are only negatively correlated to each other; they are more than singular yet less than multiple. These two domains characterize two vectors of dissolution into the indeterminable; one is the dissolution into nothing as that to which nothing can belong and by which belongings must be annulled, and the other is the vector of dissolution to the unconnected multitude. The junction between black and white realms of nothingness is a zone of dramatic illumination, neither inherent to the dark nor to the light, but to the line of unilateral distinction emerging from the tenebrous background. This emergence from the darkness of *Tenebrum* which generates a luminosity cast upon both realms is the function of determination or the making of difference. A line of illumination of this kind is peculiar to the style of Tenebrism, an accentuated form of *chiaroscuro* or clear-dark painting in which a type of luminosity is created that makes figures look as if they are ascending from the nigrescent background.[2] Shedding light on everything it traverses, the luminosity arising from the black domain of nothingness or the tenebrous void describes the function of the unilateral distinction that Deleuze ascribes to determination or difference as such, i.e., cruelty. Deleuze defines the unilaterality of distinction as follows:

There is cruelty, even monstrosity, on both sides of this struggle against an elusive adversary, in which the distinguished opposes something which cannot distinguish itself from it but continues to espouse that which divorces it. Difference is this state in which

determination takes the form of unilateral distinction.[3]

Now that we know what constitutes determination as such, we can move on to the definition of cruelty according to which Deleuze equates determination as such with cruelty, a "precise point" at which a series of implicit and explicit relationships between the determined and the undetermined are established in the form of a chain of nested cruelties.

Cruelty is nothing but determination *as such*, that precise point at which the determined maintains its essential relation with the undetermined, that rigorous abstract line fed by *chiaroscuro*.[4]

Deleuze reveals that he has predicated his concise definition of cruelty on Antonin Artaud's idea:

[...] cruelty signifies rigor, implacable intention and decision, irreversible and absolute determination.[5]

Cruelty is above all lucid, a kind of rigid control and submission to necessity.[6]

A comparison between Deleuze's definition and Artaud's germinal idea reveals that determination qua cruelty consists of a transition between a series of necessities in the form of intentions, submissions, decisions and instructions, all rigorous, conscious, irreversible and absolute, which is to say by any means and at all costs. For Artaud, such rigour first and foremost manifests in life in so far as life distinguishes itself from the void whilst the indifferent void does not partake in such vitalistic secession. Life is a strict determination in being distinguished from the void at all costs, even if the cost is submission to the necessity of the void. For this reason, life is cruel in an absolute sense as it relentlessly acts upon that which is radically exterior to it.

For it seems to me that creation and life itself are defined only by a kind of rigor, hence a fundamental cruelty, which leads things to their ineluctable end at whatever cost.[7]

If for Artaud our very existence is cruelty, it is because being is, ontologically speaking,

struggle at once monstrous and accursed. Here we witness a philosophy of cruelty proposing that the basic assumption of ontology is cruelty and only through remobilizing such cruelty as creativity we can do justice to ourselves and to the world. If *ex nihilo* is cruelty because it suggests that *something* distinguishes itself against the indeterminable void through relentless determination and at all costs, then the idea of ontology or the science of being is the very philosophy of cruelty. Now if *being something* or *to be* bespeaks of a fundamental determination, then it also bespeaks of a fundamental cruelty. From here we are directed to a radical conclusion which sheds a dramatic light on the ethics of being: ontology is the science of cruelty precisely because it is the science of *being* – a monstrous determination against the indeterminable. The implications of such a thesis signal the advent of an ethical enlightenment wherein being strives for justice by coming to terms with its cruelty, differentiating justice as a unilateral distinction from cruelty as that which refuses to estrange itself from justice. In order to support such a thesis, we should explain the reason as to why the question of ontology is the question of cruelty as such. This can be recapitulated as the possibility of rediscovering ontology as the philosophy of cruelty. In order to develop a speculative ethics of justice, first we need to develop a philosophy of cruelty in the guise of ontology so as to fundamentally support its definition of cruelty, its problems and conditions. For this reason, we proceed to a rudimentary reconstruction of ontology as the philosophy of cruelty. This includes a search for an analytical model which can explain ontological necessities and relationships in terms of determination qua cruelty and a rigorous dynamics of instructions, submissions and decisions (the third line of inquiry outlined at the beginning of this essay).

act ii: ontological reconstruction of an unspeakable torture

Through the history of philosophy, perhaps no one has reached the status of Aristotle as the great philosopher of cruelty. Such an appellation owes

tion of being as an indispensable binding of cruelty. Aristotle's approach is stated lucidly in his early comment on the torture inflicted by the Etruscan pirates on their captured enemies. Whether or not the comment adverts to a Platonic stage in the philosophic life of Aristotle, it is indisputably a decisive passage in that it exposes the elementary fundaments of Aristotle's system of intelligible ontology as a set of cruel determinations, submissions and instructions:

> Aristotle says, that we are punished much as those were who once upon a time, when they had fallen into the hands of Etruscan robbers, were slain with elaborate cruelty; their bodies, the living [*corpora viva*] with the dead, were bound so exactly as possible one against another: so our souls, tied together with our bodies as the living fixed upon the dead [*nekrous*].[8]

It has been stated by historians that the Etruscans had a genuine form of torture whose terror could not be captured by words but only by imagination. Virgil attributes the practice of this torture to King Mezentius, the king of Etruscans, who punished the soldiers of Aneas with this torture.[9] Jacques Brunschwig details this torture in his essay "Aristote et les pirates tyrrhéniens."[10] The Etruscans disseminated terror throughout their neighbouring territories by fettering the captured living soldiers to rotting corpses in a way that each member of the living person was chained to its putrefying counterpart belonging to the corpse. Face to face, mouth to mouth, hand to hand and leg to leg, the living person was fastened to the corpse in such an exact way that it could be said the living and the dead literally bound and mirrored each other on all levels.[11] The living person was usually nourished for a long time until he perished by the reek of decomposition and the subtle movements of putrefaction from the corpse to the living tissues. The Etruscans unshackled them once the person was fully putrefied by the corpse and turned black as a result. For the Etruscans, the blackening signalled the disappearance of the literally superficial difference – manifested as their

superficial identities – between the dead and the supposedly living. For if the end of the punishment coincided with the blackening of both parties' skin and the disappearance of their superficial difference or identities, then the difference was not to be found between them but within them as a nigrescent ascension blackening relations between their identities. In the Etruscan torture, the nigrescent ascension of difference which effectuates the erasure of superficial difference (the difference between X and Y, the dead and the living) corresponds with the line of illumination emerging from the black background in the paintings of Tenebrism.

Too slow to be depicted by its graphic details and too elaborate to be taken as a mere physical punishment, the Etruscan torture was a metaphysical staging of being in its putative vitality and in its determination or difference as such. A nigrescent precursor to Tenebrism and a metaphysical prototype for the Theatre of Cruelty, the Etruscan torture became a conceptual resource for philosophers, from Aristotle to Cicero, from Iamblichus to Augustine and from Alciati to Bacon. Both Iamblichus and Augustine quote from Cicero Aristotle's fragment on the Etruscan robbers with minor variations. Their accounts, however, express an emphasis on an onto-theological shift. The soul's bondage or necrosis by the dead body signifies the truth of human life or human condition on earth as a punishment (*timôria*) ensued by great sins committed prior to human existence and pre-individual guilt which genera of beings higher than human have taken upon themselves.[12] Aristotle, however, not only employs the Etruscan torture as a metaphysical model for the first time but he also explicates the composite of body–soul with regard to the Etruscan torture through elaborating the relations and necessities at work within the ontological tribulation. The idea of intelligible ontology is presented through a transition between necessities which is comprised of determinations, intentions, instructions and submissions, a gradient of cruelties each more intense than the previous. The idea of punishment or torture in this case emerges from such a transition between the *nous*, the soul and the body – the Ideal, the problem and

its solution – rather than an extrapolated idea of penance which overshadows the ontological model with an extraneously theological framework. Whereas in the passage Aristotle merely rediscovers the Etruscan torture as a metaphysical model of cruelty for the twofold of body–soul, it is only in his mathematical ideas with regard to ontology that Aristotle unfolds the tremendous consequences of such a model.

For Aristotle the ties of the soul as the force of vitality to the body should be rediscovered in terms of the living tied to the dead. The soul is the act of intellect upon the body; yet it needs an instrument – a body – to perform its special activities in regard to its inner part or Ideal which is the *nous* or the intellect. The task of the soul is to bring the universe into unison with the intellect according to its intensive *ratio* (reason) with the *nous*. The body is an instrument by which the soul can accomplish its mission in regard to the intellect. Accordingly, the soul has two activities which are characterized by their predispositions. The first activity is characterized by its necessity; it is the unitive and inward activity of the soul according to the *nous* or the undying (ideal) inner part. Consequently, the inward or necessary activity of the soul is, in fact, its intensive and enduring correlation with its inner part (the *nous*). The second activity of the soul is its extensive or outward activity, marked by its contingency since it introduces the soul to that which does not belong to it – that is the body qua *cadavera*. Moving in the direction of what is exterior to the soul, the contingent activity of the soul vitalizes matter according to the ratio derived from its intensive relation with the intellect. The contingent activity of the soul – its tie to the body qua dead – is the price of pursuing its internal tie with the intellect and being in thrall to the ambition of the *nous* in acting upon the universe with the intention of rendering it intelligible. If the act of the *nous* upon the universe corresponds with the contingent activity of the soul and also contingent activity of the soul suggests the bondage of the soul to the body qua dead, then the act of intellect is the first instance of cruelty. This brings us to Artaud's dictum: "everything that acts is cruelty."[13] Yet we will show that cruelty as the

act of intellect – harboured by the idea of vitality and the intelligible ontology – is merely an opening to a maze of an inexhaustible cruelty. Determination of being or the idea of ontology, in this sense, is a labyrinth of cruelty from whose turns and twists no one can escape.

The fact is that every living thing among us suffers the torment of Mezentius – that the living perish in the embrace of the dead: and although the vital nature enjoys itself and runs things for a while, the influence of parts nevertheless gets the upper hand not long afterwards, and does so according to the nature of the substance and not at all to the nature of the living one.[14]

we shall elaborate, corresponds to a synthesis between two necroses, two indeterminable lines of dissolution and two systems of cruelty. In concluding that the determination of being as such can be attributed to the reciprocal relation between two indeterminable realms, we can return to Deleuze's philosophy of difference. In the fourth chapter of *Difference and Repetition*, Ideas and the Synthesis of Difference, Deleuze argues that dx is not determinable in regard to x, nor is dy to y, yet dx and dy as two undifferentiated realms of dissolution are determinable in regard to each other (dy/dx).[15] The unbinding of ontological reason generates a differential domain of cruelty founded on the reciprocal synthesis of two systems of cruelty. In differ-

synthesis of two systems of cruelty. In differentiating such a domain, the intensive and extensive investments of ontological reason coalesce into a reason of base cruelty whose site of activity is that of being.

In order to fully absorb its conceptual wealth, Aristotle arithmetically captures the metaphysical cruelty of the Etruscans. The Etruscan torture is thus arithmetically reinvented as a procedure called *aphairesis*, a negation of belongings or subtraction. Later, neo-Platonists and apophatic theologians utilized this procedure to determine the One or affirm the Ideal through its ineffability or indifference to the conditional qua belonging.[16] *Aphairesis* is an arithmetic procedure consisting of two vectors corresponding to the activities of the soul qua living in regard to the *nous* and the body qua dead. These vectors are intensive and extensive; yet despite their directional polarity, they are operationally reciprocal. The negative vector is the vector of removal whereby belongings or attributes are subtracted from a magnitude. The positive vector, on the other hand, emphasizes the possibility of conservation and persistence against subtraction. The vectors of *aphairesis* respectively effectuate the removed and the remainder in subtraction. The debasing coupling of the soul with the body qua dead expresses a temporal correlation with belonging (qua the instrument or mortal body) which is subjected to removal and subtraction. Yet the enduring bond of the soul with the *nous* corresponds with the conservable correlation with the inner part (qua the Ideal or

The metaphysical model of the Etruscan torture explains determination of being as such in terms of bindings that chain the living to the dead – both qua the undetermined and to an internal vitality qua the determined. The living require both bindings to determine themselves against the dead and in regard to their own vitality. In the Aristotelian model, determination of being as such is also comprised of two bindings or vectors: the positive determination in regard to the *nous* as a vital necessity within the soul and the negative determination of the soul against the body qua dead. The two activities of the soul, correspondingly, stand for the intensive and extensive vectors of determination which respectively determine being in regard to an inner necessity (the Ideal of determination) and against the undetermined.

act iii: determination of being or synthesis of two indeterminable deaths

Being qua being or the idea of intelligible ontology is determined by the ratio of the extensive or contingent activities of the soul to its intensive or necessary activities. We shall now argue that the determination of being does not correspond with the ratio of a necrosis (extension to the body as an ephemeral instrument) to a vital immortality (intension towards the enduring *nous*), or the ratio of the undetermined to the determined. Such determination,

necessity) which continues to remain under any subtractive condition – the positive vector of *aphairesis*. Therefore, the vectors of *aphairesis* arithmetically capture the extensive and intensive vectors of determination as such – negative determination against the undetermined and positive determination in regard to an inner Ideal or necessity. Whilst the latter finds difference in affirmation of a necessity or the vital persistence of the inner part against negation, the former negatively binds the undetermined; it is the subtraction of the body qua belonging which is epiphenomenal to the affirmation of the inner necessity or the intensive determination.

Negation results from affirmation: this means that negation arises in the wake of affirmation or beside it, *but only as the shadow of the more profound genetic element* – of that power or "will" which engenders the affirmation and the difference in the affirmation.[17]

At this stage, in order to show that being qua being is a site of progressive cruelty, we shall argue that even the enduring and determinable correlation of the soul with the *nous* is a site of necrosis. By unbinding the arithmetical twists implicated within the Etruscan torture as a metaphysical model, we shall argue that the intensive determination of being in terms of an ontological necessity is a source of indefatigable cruelty.

According to the subtractive logic of *aphairesis*, persistence with regard to an ideal inner part (intensive conservation) cannot be maintained other than by the continuation of extensive subtraction or negation of belongings. By the Ideal we mean that which is inherently "foreclosed" to the intensive operation of belonging and integrally withstands the dispossessing power of subtraction (i.e., being qua *being*, the *nous* or the One). Determination of being in terms of an ontological necessity begins with the negation of belonging. Likewise, determination of genera of being in terms of the *nous* requires the negative binding of the body qua *cadavera*. In other words, ontological discourse begins with the *subtractive* binding of belonging. However, this simultaneous negation of belongings (or removal)

and correlation with an ideal inner part (or remaining) can only take place through the contraction of the remainder. *Contraction is an intensive medium for the making of difference* or determination of being as such; it bespeaks a basic principle of subtraction or *aphairesis* – the more belongings are removed, the less the remainder gets.[18] For this reason, contraction integrates all the determinants required for the intensive determination of being as such: the shedding of belongings (removal); repetition (subsumed within the reiterated subtraction of belonging in *aphairesis*); conserving the correlation with an inner part (continuation of remaining); and the intensification of the correlation with the Ideal. In *aphairesis*, such intensification manifests as shrinkage or diminution of the remainder (remaining less).

Chained to the negative contingency imposed by the body qua *cadavera*, the soul cannot continue its correlation with the *nous* other than through contraction. In medieval sources of natural philosophy as well as esotericism, this contraction manifests as a shrivelling body. It is sometimes a corpse, a tree or a shrivelled-up fruit from which a cosmic array of entities are *individuated* and come forth.[19] In late medieval and early Renaissance alchemy as the science of determining ideas, this contraction is necessary for extracting and revealing the correlation of the substance with its true ideas (ideals); that is to say, determining the substance in terms of its intensive ideas and necessities. In medieval alchemy, the nigrescent slime known as *caput mortuum* characterizes the state of contraction through which the vital ideas of the substance can be determined. *Caput mortuum* is the remaining of the substance after its vital ideas have been determined and extracted, a shrivelled body (residuum) which has lost its attributes or belongings. Without this contraction or the remainder which has undergone intensive diminution and blackening, the attributes qua belongings cannot be shed and true ideas of the substance cannot be determined or distilled.

Through contraction, the soul can contemplate its inner part (the *nous*) and being can contemplate its intensive determination with regard to an ontological necessity. Contraction, here,

"refers to the fusion of successive tick-tocks in a contemplative soul."[20] These repeating tick-tocks are the vibrations of the subtractive correlation between development and envelopment of the soul, the negation of belonging and the conservation of an inner part (or ontological necessity). As the intensive medium of ontological determination, contraction is the curse of swinging back and forth between the *nomos* of the dead and the *nous* of the living; it imposes the cruelty of drawing difference from repetition which here is a passage "from external differences to singular difference,"[21] from extensive determination through negation of belongings to the intensive determination of being in regard to its ontological necessity. In the metaphysical model of the Etruscan torture, whilst the necrotic correlation with the body qua dead refers to determination via negation of belongings, the putative vitality inherent to the living suggests the intensive ontological determination via affirmation of an inner necessity qua Ideal. The pendular movement between the outward necrosis and the presumed inner vitality thereby brings about the possibility of contraction as the medium required for the contemplation of ontological necessity.

Contraction is a difference or a modification of the contemplative soul – indeed, the modification of this soul, the only modification which truly belongs to it and after which it dies – it

appears that the most material repetition occurs only by means of and within a soul which draws a difference from repetition.[22]

We argued that contraction entails the shedding of belongings and the conservation of an inner part qua necessity. To put it succinctly, contraction envelops the requirements for the intensive determination of being as such. But what is the motor of such contraction or what *determines* the intensive medium of determination of being as such? In other words, if in *aphairesis* contraction suggests the state of remaining, or more accurately, remaining less, then what guarantees this lessening or shedding of belongings? Our answer to these questions is that only non-belonging – *that which belongs to nothing and to which nothing belongs* – can extensively guarantee the shedding of belongings and intensively ensures the lessening of the remainder or contraction. The intensive idea of ontology can only distinguish itself by factoring in the primacy of non-belonging qua the void.

In order to shed belongings and contract towards the Ideal, the primacy of non-belonging qua nothing must be affirmed and internalized. Through its absolute indifference and exteriority to belonging, the void qua non-belonging becomes a prime guarantor for the determination of being as such, because the intensive realization of such determination lies in the essential

towards the Ideal approximates the void and its exteriority to belonging. However, the void is not only exterior to belonging but also to the ontological necessity of the Ideal. To put it differently, in order to distinguish being in regard to an internal necessity, determination must prioritize the reign of the void qua non-belonging which cannot be conflated with the ontological Ideal under any condition whatsoever. If we consider the intensive determination of being as the problem, the recourse to the void as the prime guarantor constitutes the solution. But it is precisely this solution that cannot be reconciled with the ideal which is an ontological necessity inherent to being. For this reason, solution is indeed a manifest cruelty in that it entails a submission to a problematic necessity: implicit surrendering to the intervention of the void in order to be explicitly distinguished from it.

We argued that the intensive determination of being which tries to correlate being with an ontological necessity is dependent on the intervention of the void. Therefore, the seemingly conclusive correlation of being with its ontological necessity enforces a higher form of bondage which is already there. This is why in the Etruscan torture the victim is released once its body turns black. The negative binding of the belonging qua dead does not lead to the positive binding of the void which manifests as a line of blackening emerging from within. In this sense, ontological reason meticulously implements a fully fledged system of bondage from within. Cruelty does not end in wedding the soul to the dead, for it is constantly perpetuated by interiorizing the void within the soul to bring about the possibility of the soul's resistance against the dead and the possibility of its persistence in regard to the *nous*. Determination of being as such is cruelty but such cruelty is not a unified field of cruelty because the sources of such cruelty are more than one. Being as determination against the void is cruelty, and only by correlating these two sources can it maintain its persistence and proclivity – that is unilateral distinction or the realization of *ex nihilo*. The two

of necrosis, or two means of humiliating yet necessary bondage to the realm of the dead:

• One is the wedding of the soul to the body qua dead or the contingency of the outside. It is the realm of unconnected or subtracted belongings to which being can only contingently or negatively extend. Although belongings are determinable, there is no determination between them. We call this indeterminable realm the realm of death by negative determinations or dissolution by means of the *undifferentiated many*.

• The other realm, colder than the first, is inherent to the ontological necessity of being. This source of cruelty entails the binding of the soul to the void in order to preserve its vital bond with the *nous*. It is recourse to the void in order to determine the ontological necessity of being, but since nothing can belong to the void, such recourse – namely solution as belonging – is essentially a source of the problematic. Therefore, the second source of cruelty is problematic binding of the void; it is *death by the problematic* or becoming problematic by means of the absolute indeterminable. Such problematicity is neither sponsored by the many nor the One but by the void qua non-belonging.

Determination of being as such is only possible as the ratio between these two indeterminable deaths or forms of cruelty – the negative mobilization of belonging and the binding of the void qua non-belonging. The vitality of the soul qua living can only be determined once it is accurately fixed upon the dead and is firmly fastened to the void. Accordingly, the reciprocal relation of the two indeterminates or systems of cruelty presents a problem that could not be hitherto solved or posed – that is the problem of being *qua being*, the intensive idea of ontology. Determination as cruelty is simultaneously a struggle against and a submission to the synthesis of two indeterminable deaths which reign from within and from without. Determination is cruelty because it is neither generated by the synthesis of determinables nor an indeterminable realm (negative mobilization of contingency)

act iv: determination as a problematizing correlation between two systems of cruelty, or the possibility of non-dialectical sadomasochism

against a determinable one (the secured necessity of within). Instead, determination of being as such is ensued by submission to the reciprocal synthesis of two indeterminable realms (dy/dx). Constantly in struggle to distinguish itself through such a synthesis, determination as such is reckless; it is bent on securing a ground at all costs even by means of coupling with the dead and being problematically intimate with the void. The tenacity of such a determination is no less cruel than its consequences and the prices it must pay. If determination of being is the idea of ontology and if this determination is cruelty in all directions, then ontology is an elaborate science of cruelty.

The impact of Deleuze's philosophy of difference qua cruelty on ontology is – without exaggeration – imbued with inconclusive complications. Such complications equally and inevitably problematize not only traditional ontology but also Deleuze's own seemingly vitalistic philosophy.[23] Perhaps the most critical of such complications – by virtue of acting on both the philosophy of difference and ontology – is the problem of duplicitous determination: being qua being is determination against the void but such a determination requires, by necessity, an implicit recourse to the void. It is through this implicit return to the void as the problematizing solution that the void determines difference or determination as such. According to the problem of determination, being qua being is both the determining subject and the problematically determined object of the void. By underpinning ontological reason through ratifying the univocity of being, the philosophy of difference remains reticent toward the problem of duplicitous determination, since it mainly envelopes the problem in favour of the universal idea of being rather than arresting the idea of being in favour of the problem through which determination of being as such is implicitly guaranteed. The problem of cruelty, instead, supplants the philosophy of being as such through the philosophy of cruelty rather than the philosophy of being as such.

For the philosophy of cruelty, the problem of duplicitous determination substantiates ontology under the aegis of its bondage to the void; therefore, it speaks of principle (of cruelty) which must be brought to the foreground rather than be dissembled or disavowed in favour of saving the ontological reason. Whereas, in ontology, being cannot be determined other than in terms of itself (univocity as applied to *ens in communi*), in the philosophy of cruelty, being is implicitly determined by the void under the heading of the problematic. Before it can be "said in one and the same sense of all its individuating differences or intrinsic modalities,"[24] being must be said or determined in the sense of itself.[25] Yet determination of being as such is dependent upon the intervention of the void, which is to say, being-in-itself cannot be said or determined in the sense of itself. If according to the philosophy of cruelty the univocality of being is ultimately determined by non-belonging of the void as that which is simultaneously outside of being and immanent to it, then univocality of being is determined by the equivocality of its inexistence. Equivocal inexistence is not being-nothing, for it suggests that being cannot be said in the one and the same sense, whether it is in the sense of being or the void. Philosophy of cruelty proposes that the univocality of being is determined by an irreversibly problematic bondage to that which

corroborating role of ontological reason for ontology with the problematizing role of its own. This problematizing role determines being through its problematical bondage to that which does not belong to it rather than through its presupposed vital correlation with an internal ontological necessity. To put it differently, for the philosophy of cruelty, the ontological problem bespeaks of cruelty rather than determination, because the problem is essentially a submission to a necessity *at whatever cost*, even if the cost and renders it problematic. It is precisely this *embracing of the cost* against the priority of the necessity that the philosophy of cruelty insinuates. Determination of being in terms of an ontological necessity is a problem qua cruelty in so far as it costs a return to the void as that which is exterior to the ontological necessity.

does not belong to it, and hence it is equivocally inexistent, which is another way of saying that being is existent and indeed univocal *only problematically* by virtue of the void. Equivocity of inexistence does not suggest any internal division within being or plurality of ontological senses; it still conforms to the univocity of being but only under the heading of problematicity of determination of being as such. In short, the philosophy of cruelty stages the univocality of being implicated in the philosophy of difference as a problematical bondage to the void.

Determination emerges through a subtractive synthesis between two forms of cruelty, an explicit form corresponding to the living and an implicit form which mandates reconsummation with the void. Ontology is ultimately a differential between these two forms of cruelty, each with its own mechanisms of torture, atrocious creativities, rules and problems. It is in the light of a philosophy of cruelty that Deleuze's philosophy of difference can be integrated with his investigation of formal systems of cruelty, namely sadism and masochism. In this sense, *Difference and Repetition* can also be understood as a work that continues the study of cruelty from a non-dialectical approach to the formal systems of cruelty in "Coldness and Cruelty" in *Masochism* (1967) to a differential formulation of cruelty in *Difference and Repetition* (1968). This critical shift marks a transition from a particular definition of cruelty to a universal and hence more radical definition.

Determination of being as such or the idea of ontology brings forth two systems of cruelty in the form of metaphysical sadism and masochism. The distinction between the two is not antithetical but rather stems from their exclusive or incommensurable sets of rules and respective problems. According to Deleuze's analysis in "Coldness and Cruelty," such distinction spontaneously emerges from the institutional/imposing relations in sadism and contractual bonds in masochism.[26] For determination of being, in the same vein, metaphysical sadism corresponds with the cruelty ensued by the instruction of the Ideal directed at being. The dialectic between problem and

solution or between the soul and the body must be conducted under the heading of the Ideal or the *nous* which posits an institutional network of relations between the soul and the body. The soul must extend to the body qua dead following the instruction of the *nous*. The domain of sadism is thus founded through imposition which is instructed and executed with a certain degree of explicitness that Deleuze associates with the "demonstrative language" of sadism.[27] In other words, the explicit dialectic between problem and solution in determination of being as such is ensued by the emphatic instruction of the Ideal and therefore corresponds to a domain of metaphysical sadism. Here the problem is recognized as the soul's mission of bringing beings into unison with the intellect, whilst the solution is constituted of the soul's extension to the instrumental body as that which is contingent to its vitality. It is the *nous* qua the Ideal that poses the problem and inspires the solution through an explicit line of ontological reasoning which leads to the bondage of the soul to the body qua *nekros*. Therefore, the explicit side of ontological reason which has been imposed by the Ideal upon the correlation between the problem and solution is itself a form of violence. In "Coldness and Cruelty," Deleuze identifies the equation of reason-as-violence with the violence of sadism where the vector of negation overlaps the explicit line of ontological reasoning.[28] This is a violence which must be repeated in the form of *reiterative* subtraction and in the manner of sadism's *monotony* so that the Ideal can connect the intensive determination of itself to the extensive determination of that which cannot be counted as the Ideal. Since the *nous* qua the Ideal must simultaneously dispose of matter and bring lower genera of beings into unison with itself, the dialectic between the soul and the body or the extensive determination of being as such has to abide by the laws of the negative. It means that the body qua belonging must be negated as much as it must be instrumentalized to develop the extensive vector of determination, i.e, determination of being against that which cannot be distinguished in terms of being and only being. Therefore, the negative determination of the

body qua belonging which is imposed by the Ideal corresponds with the explicit line of ontological reasoning which principally indulges in negation. It is the Sadean realm of cruelty where, according to Deleuze, universal negation as an idea of pure and emphatic reason is posited.

> In the work of Sade, imperatives and descriptions transcend themselves toward the higher function of demonstration: the demonstrative function is based on universal negativity as an active process, and on universal negation as an idea of pure reason [...][29]

It is the intensive idea of ontology guaranteed by the intervention of the void that brings forth metaphysical masochism. For metaphysical masochism, the binding of the void pertains to a contractual relation with the void. The void guarantees the shedding of belongings and contraction whilst, in return, being submits to the primacy of the void in order to remain in or conform to its ontological terms. As an explicit form of cruelty corresponding to the fastening of the living to the necrotized other at the order of the Ideal, metaphysical sadism chains *being* to the instrumental contingency of belonging. Therefore, metaphysical sadism takes form by employing a subtractive correlation with belonging so as to convert the negation of belonging (or the *nomos* of the *nekrous*) into the realization of being-in-itself (or the *nous* of the living). Metaphysical masochism, however, is the implicit form of cruelty encompassed by the intensive determination of being as such. In order to posit an ontological necessity for itself, being binds cruelty from within in the form of an unconditional *submission* to the void. Metaphysical masochism is the cruelty of *duplicitous determination*; it conflates the determined struggle against the void with the submission to the resolving intervention of the void. Determination of being as such intensively employs masochistic reason to find an inner locus for the deployment of the ontological necessity of being.

In order to determine being as such, the extensive vector of determination – which is the negative binding of belonging imposed by the Ideal – must be correlated with the intensive vector of determination which entails the contractual bondage to the void. Whilst the former corresponds with metaphysical sadism, the latter suggests a metaphysical masochism. In this sense, being as such problematically combines metaphysical sadism with metaphysical masochism. According to Deleuze, sadomasochism is essentially a problematic term,[30] yet the sheer problematic nature of such a term or synthetic system of cruelty does not attest to its impossibility. The possibility of ontological sadomasochism is indeed the import of its problematical synthesis according to which the incommensurable (the problem) is solved (rendered commensurable) by and in accordance with that which is exterior to the problem's Ideal and respective conditions, i.e., by the intervention of the void. On an ontological level, metaphysical sadism and masochism are problematically correlated with each other. It is, in fact, determination as such that problematically distinguishes itself through the problematical synthesis of two indeterminable systems of cruelty. In doing so, determination of being as such brings about the possibility of sadomasochism as a field of problematic (cruelty). Accordingly, sadomasochism does not express a complementary and dialectical unity between sadism and masochism. In sadomasochism as a problematical field of cruelty between sadism and masochism, the bond between the two is not complementary but subtractive and it is differential rather than dialectical. In positing its idea, ontology induces a problematic correlation between the two formal systems of cruelty and thereby establishes a problematical entity called sadomasochism. Being qua being is sadomasochism in that it problematically correlates two incommensurable systems of cruelty in order to determine itself in relation to an internal necessity and against the undetermined.

act v: necessity of a philosophy of cruelty in the wake of an interminable cruelty

We argued that once the idea of ontology is stripped to its basic components, what surfaces is a profoundly meshed system of elaborate cruelty. However, in terms of ontology as the science of being, cruelty *as such*. A cruelty that can be concluded or terminated is not a radical cruelty, for it is subjected to the conditional. In regard to a cruelty which is dominated by the conditional, justice is merely the relocation of cruelty. This interminability of cruelty echoes a philosophy of the problematic wherein problems cannot be terminated by their solutions and which Deleuze traces back to Immanuel Kant:

> Kant even refers to Ideas as problems "to which there is no solution". By that he does not mean that Ideas are necessarily false problems and thus insoluble but, on the contrary, that true problems are Ideas, and that these Ideas do not disappear with "their" solutions, since they are the indispensible condition without which no solution would ever exist.[31]

In order to demonstrate that cruelty of ontology is interminable or resistant to correlation with any conclusive state or condition exterior to the field of its problematical determination, we must return once again to the Etruscan torture as a metaphysical model. According to the Etruscan metaphysical cruelty, the coupling of the living to the dead not only expresses the movement of the negative vector of subtraction (namely negative tie to the belonging qua dead) but also its positive vector which is the conservation of the soul after its descent into the realm of the dead.[32] Without such conservation, the soul qua the living is instantly mortified by the dead. In other words, subtraction does not guarantee the persistence of the remainder, nor does it presuppose the possibility of a remainder or an initial conservation. The possibility of the remainder merely points to a *condition* in *aphairesis* because subtraction may totally exhaust the given magnitude and therefore leaves no remainder. If in subtraction or negative mobilization of belongings, remainder – regardless of its persistence – is nothing but a mere possibility, then how is it that determination of being as such or the idea of ontology is assertively constructed upon such a possibility? Only when the possibility of the remainder is taken as an Ideal can the soul contract towards the intellect [or *being*] and be intensively determined. The soul can only conserve its correlation with its inner part or the *nous* if it is itself not subtracted by can only conserve its correlation with its inner part or the *nous* if it is itself not subtracted by the negative bond with the body qua belonging. For this reason, the possibility of a remainder or the possibility of the soul's survival after being tethered to the body qua dead is merely an ideal or problematical condition. It is problematical because such possibility is grounded as an emphatic ideality. In other words, the possibility of condition (the remainder) is determined against the impossibility of condition (namely the subtractive mobilization of non-belonging by which all belongings must be shed). We call this emphatic grounding of determination of being on a problematical possibility, anterior ideal; because it precedes the second ideal. The second or posterior ideal is the emphasis on the possibility of remaining or the persistence of what has been conserved. The determination of being can only be effectuated between these two problematical ideals. The anterior ideal is the possibility of being conceived from non-belonging or the void; it posits the possibility of a remainder in subtraction as an emphatic possibility or ideal condition. For this reason, the anterior ideal is a problematical life, for it grounds being on the possibility of escaping the negative power of the void. Accordingly, it is the problematical life (the possibility of the remainder) that brings

Of cruelty qua determination of being, one should never anticipate an end to cruelty. Because when it comes to cruelty, one cruelty always rests upon another in a chain which cannot be broken by force. We shall now have the occasion to argue that fundamental cruelty – which is inherent to ontology – is not simply cruelty in so far as it has its foundation in cruelty but also because to such a metaphysical cruelty no end can be imposed. In other words, determination of being is cruelty in so far as it simultaneously resists and submits to the synthesis of two indeterminable deaths; yet what makes such a determination cruel under any condition whatsoever is that it cannot be resolved or concluded. Therefore, what makes determination of being as such ultimately cruel is that in addition to the inexhaustibility of the sources of cruelty, cruelty cannot be terminated. It is this interminable cruelty that makes determination of being, cruelty *as such*. A cruelty that can be

demonstrate the unbinding role of the philosophy of cruelty for "being as the problematic" of the philosophy of difference. We have argued that it is the philosophy of cruelty and not the philosophy of difference that brings the problem of *duplicitous determination* to the foreground: unilateral distinction of being as such is implicitly determined by the void. This implicit determination is quite different from saying that the void does not distinguish itself from that which breaks from it; rather, it suggests that the principle of determination as such mobilizes the void as an equivocal problem. In a less technical sense, being qua difference-in-itself is a *return* to the void under new problems and conditions. These problems and conditions constitute the very ground of ontology and its respective Ideals and problems. For this reason, an ethical approach to ontological problems should abandon the priority of a univocal ontological necessity for being and confront "being as the problematic" (Deleuze) without factoring in any such privilege.

Whereas for the philosophy of difference "being as difference" is cruelty in so far as it rigorously and irreversibly sets itself against the undetermined, for the philosophy of cruelty "being as difference" can only resolve the intensive course of determination by recourse to the void and bringing about its intervention. Therefore, the philosophy of cruelty not only confirms the explicit cruelty of "being as difference" but also accentuates the implicit cruelty embedded within difference-in-itself – that is the necessity of binding the void as a guarantor for intensive determination. Accordingly, within the ontological domain, the contractual (masochistic) bondage to the void as a constitutional primacy precedes the supposed primacy of the ontological necessity. Hence, in the light of the philosophy of cruelty, "being as difference" is a being whose correlation with its ontological necessity is a twist into and out of the void. Ironically, for this reason, *being as a differential field of cruelty* is not a direct conclusion of the philosophy of difference; rather, it is the index of the philosophy of cruelty where the explicit cruelty of determination (or unilateral distinction) is wedded to the implicit

and contractual bondage to the void. It is this *being as a differential field of cruelty* that calls for a speculative ethics of justice which is disillusioned about the precarious position of an ontological necessity and does not situate itself outside of the problematic.

The underlying ethical assumption of Deleuze's philosophy of difference is that justice should be internal to the problematic qua cruelty. The philosophy of cruelty, however, takes this one step further in order to unbind the true speculative opportunities of the problematic; it conjoins the essential internality to the problematic with being's equivocal inexistence (or the inherent problematicity of being as such). The latter is a line of enlightenment drawn by the philosophy of cruelty and entails the toppling of any ontological or noetic priority presumed within and for being. It is through the marriage between problematicity and equivocal inexistence that the true speculative power of ethics is unbound. In the wake of the philosophy of cruelty, ethics can return to the mathesis of the problem once again wherein the problem is not determined by its solution or conditions but by its capacity to generate fields of the problematic. However, for the philosophy of cruelty, this ethical return to the problematic nature of ontological problems consists in binding of the void and breaking apart from the constraints of the priority of an ontological necessity for being. Philosophy of cruelty explains ontological determinations in terms of sadistic (imperative) and masochistic (contractual) bondages to that which does not belong to being, i.e., the problematic chains to the void. In order for the ethics of justice to confront the problems and conditions associated with ontological determinations – ourselves and our world – it must tread through such problematical fields which are equivocally determined by the void and the ontological medium. The philosophy of cruelty, in this sense, inaugurates the opportunities of grounding ethics on a new definition of being unshackled from the priority of its ontological necessity and mobilized by its chains to that which is exterior to it – the universal.

14 Bacon 353.

15 Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* 172.

16 On *aphairesis* as a fundamental logico-semantic concept in the works of Aristotle and neo-Platonists regarding the procedure of negation and determination of the Ideal, see Martin.

17 Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* 55; emphasis in original.

18 Aside from its interrelations with the concept of intensity, the scholastic notion of contraction is a fundamental ontological and noetic concept which Deleuze resurrects in *Difference and Repetition* by meticulously presenting it in conjunction with Stoic physics and cosmology. On the concept of contraction in scholasticism, see Catana. And for an alternative Bergsonian/Stoic philosophy of subtraction and contraction in relation to Deleuze's philosophy of immanence and becoming, see Meillassoux 63–107.

19 There are numerous sources on the cosmology of putrefaction and diminution (decay) in the Middle Ages. See, for example, Ginzburg.

20 Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* 74.

21 Ibid. 76.

22 Ibid. 286.

23 For an elaborately rigorous critique of Deleuze's philosophy of vitalism and an alternative analysis of unilateral determination, see Brassier 140–45, 162–204.

24 Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* 36.

25 "[…] but Being is the same for everything about which it is said." On the univocity of Being, see idem, *The Logic of Sense* 205–06.

26 See idem, *Masochism* 20.

27 Ibid. 18–19, 25–30.

28 Ibid. 18–19.

29 Ibid. 35.

30 Ibid. 13–14, 132–34.

31 Idem, *Difference and Repetition* 168.

32 On the soul's mortification or *katapsis* with regard to the Etruscan torture, see Winston and Dillon.

14 Bacon 353.

...enebrism and the early Renaissance philo- ...s of nature and alchemy, see Rzepińska 91–

...uze, *Difference and Repetition* 28.

...29.

...aud 101.

...102.

...103.

...ro (qtg from Aristotle) in *Hortensius* (95M). ...o Bos 315–16. Bos argues that the meticu- ...lationship of the soul – on behalf of the ...incorporeal *nous* – with the body qua ...ment captures the idea of intelligible ontol- ...human life on earth as a punishment ...).

...Virgil, *The Aeneid*, VIII: 483–88. See also ...nberg 403–31. Kronenberg associates the ...y of Mezentius with an Epicurean/ ...alist reinterpretation of Aristotle's idea of ...ble ontology and incarnate life.

...Brunschwig 171–90.

...Italian jurist Andrea Alciati created a series ...blems based on Virgil's depiction of the ...an torture for his *Emblemata* (1531), an influ- ...collection of moral sayings. Known as ...*Contagioso* or *Nupta Cadavera* (marriage ...e diseased or the dead), these emblems ...a naked woman being tied to a male ...at the order of the king, or a man walking ...female corpse fastened to his body ...ancisco Goya's Disparates, plate no. 7, ...*trimonial*).

...it is an inspired saying of the ancients ...the soul pays penalties and that we live ...he punishment of great sins. For, indeed, ...conjunction of the soul with the body ...s very much like this. For as the ...uscans are said often to torture captives ...haining dead bodies face to face with the ...g, fitting part to part, so the soul seems ...e extended throughout and affixed to all ...sensitive members of the body. ...blichus 48. See also Augustine)

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Deleuze, Gilles. *...Logic of Sense.* ... Lester. ...nuum, 2004.

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(c) Vampyroteuthian Art

Both men and Vampyroteuthes are engaged against oblivion, this fundamental tendency in nature. Both store and transmit acquired information. Both are historical beings. Although both are engaged in memory, we are not so in relation to the same type of memory; we do not even use the same methods to store data, and this is the decisive difference.

Men seek to imprint acquired information upon objects. Other men that pass by the informed objects will collect such information, thereafter "objectified". We trust the relative presence of the objective world, and that is why we entrust it with our acquired information. We trust that informed objects may outlive us, and after our deaths attest to our passage through the world. Therefore, humanity hopes to possess two types of information storage: one for genetic information, the egg, and one for acquired information, objective culture (books, buildings, paintings). Thanks to this storage humanity considers itself immortal: within the egg as a species, and within informed objects as individuals.

This human trust in the permanence of the objective world seems quite derisory from the point of view of those who, like Vampyroteuthis, inhabit a liquid environment. From this point of view, the only material for information storage that is worthy of trust is the egg. Genetic information is *aere perennius*[9] and will not only outlive all books, buildings and paintings, but also the species itself, although in a mutated form. Long after all of the human creative oeuvre has been reduced to dust, human genetic information shall continue to be transmitted from generation to generation, although possibly by a species evolved from humans. So much so, that the problem of historical engagement is to elaborate

methods that allow for acquired data to be stored in the same memory that also stores inherited data. Thus placing trust in the permanence of the species and its future development, and not in the permanence of the objective world. In fact, such storage and transmission methods may resort to objects. However, such objects shall not be storage material, but transmission channels, media.

It may seem at first glance that this difference between types of memories and methods is not that decisive. That it is merely a difference in emphasis. Men also consider objects as media, and when they manipulate objects they also seek to transform them from barriers into communication channels that transmit information to other men. Vampyroteuthis also resorts to several types of objects (colours, lights, sepia clouds), which he manipulates in order to transmit information to other Vampyroteuthes. The difference is only that men trust the permanence of objects more so than Vampyroteuthes. This minimisation of the difference, however, would be misleading. Because man is one who seeks his immortality in objects, and that is why he expresses himself through them. Vampyroteuthis is one who seeks his immortality in the other and that is why he expresses himself in others through objects. It is about two different gestures of articulation, two different manifestations of the spirit, two types of publication, two different public attitudes, two different ways of externalising intimacies in order to publish the private, to exhibit the inhibited; two opposing attitudes in relation to the ineffable. In sum, it effectively comes down to two different types of art.

When man seeks to express a particular experience, when he seeks to make audible the inaudible and visible the invisible, he does it in function of a particular object. Within human articulation, experience and object are inseparable from each other. Everything that man experiences is experienced "for" a particular object: for marble, for a particular spoken or written language, for musical sounds, for celluloid film. And every object that man encounters on his way towards death implicitly contains the categories that allow the

articulation of particular experien[ce] sentiment, thought, value or desire. It is no[t] man has experiences first and then seeks [an] object through which to express it. Man e[xperiences the] world, as of now, in function of a partic[ular object:] marble sculptor, as orator or writer of Portug[uese,] musician, as film producer. The objects, be [them] "material" or "immaterial", be them stones and bon[es,] numbers and letters, shape all human experience.

Every object is perfidious: it resists the hu[man] attempt to inform it, and every object is perfidious [in its] own way. Stone breaks when hammered, bone cracks w[hen] chiselled, numbers impose their own rules on tho[se] expressed through them, linear writing transforms [the] sentiment expressed through it. To inform objects [is to] struggle against the specific perfidy of every object. [This] struggle slowly reveals the resistance of objects: [the] structure of cotton that gives way, of glass that crack[s, of] concrete that dries out, of the tonal scale that beco[mes] tempered, or of the syntax that flexes. So that [the] discovery of the structure implicit in every object is in i[tself] also an experience that men acquire. It is such a vio[lent] experience, that not only does it generate appropr[iate] knowledge and techniques for specific objects, but [also] changes man himself. It is therefore important to store [and] transmit these acquired experiences, and this via meth[ods] of expression proper to the object. In so doing, th[ere] emerges "feedback" between man and object, thro[ugh] which man informs the object and imprints upon [it] experiences that will be used again to inform objects. Su[ch] "feedback" is the essence of human art.

The object's resistance provokes man. As if it wa[s a] voice that came from the object, calling to be informe[d.] This is the human vocation. There are men whose vocati[on] it is to inform stones, and others whose vocation it is [to] inform letters. Whoever does not discover the object of [his] vocation will live in frustration. The vocation, th[e] "feedback" between man and object, is so passionate[ly] engaging that it leads man to forget his original purpo[se,] that of informing objects so that the information can [...]

continue to be available to other men. The object itself absorbs man's interest. In the same way that stone transforms into statue and writing into text, man is transformed into sculptor and writer and forgets that he is a man for other men. Man, with all his feelings, thoughts, values and desires realises himself in stone and in letters, all of his passions and actions become concentrated upon the object. An example of this objectification of existential interest is poetry. Language is apparently a medium for intersubjective communication, and yet the poet realises himself during the struggle against the deeply rooted rules and structures of language. No longer does he speak through the language, but against it. Creating an object out of its intersubjectivity. The poet's vocation is to inform language.

Human art is not, as the well-meaning bourgeoisie would have us believe, the fabrication of "beautiful" objects. Human art is the gesture through which man imprints his experience upon the object of his vocation in order to realise himself in it, to immortalise himself in it. Every object that is informed is therefore a "work of art", be it a mathematical equation, political institution, or symphony. In fact, the mathematical equation transmits above all epistemological information, the political institution transmits ethical information, and the symphony transmits aesthetic information. However, this labelling of "works" as scientific, political and artistic is misleading. Because every human experience to be expressed in objects implies all three of these informative parameters. Every experience implies knowledge, value and sensation, and it does so simultaneously. To separate informed objects, "culture", according to the three labels is to ignore that man is one who, by vocation, expresses acquired experiences onto objects. One who, by vocation, "works". And that every human work is art, an answer to a provocation by a particular object.

Objects do not provoke Vampyroteuthis. Objects do not divert his existential interest: he aims always towards the other. His creative activity through which he stores acquired experiences goes beyond objects, directed towards the other. The sepia cloud does not impede his tentacles, as human fingers are impeded by stone. His chromatophores are not curtailed by the rules of skin colouration, as is human speech by linguistic rules. Tentacles and chromatophores go beyond the object. They do not "make", they "complete". His creation is not "performed", but "perfected". That is why when he creates, Vampyroteuthis does not experience the resistance of the object but the resistance of the other. When he articulates the ineffable, he does not struggle against the resistance of matter, but against the resistance of the message's receiver. He does not want to violate objects by imposing new information upon them; in order to be informed it is the other that has to be violated. The other's memory is for Vampyroteuthis the same as stone and language are for us. Vampyroteuthis is sculptor and writer working against the other. He hammers and composes the other. Vampyroteuthis' vocation is the other. It is during the violation of the other that Vampyroteuthis realises himself. It is through this struggle against the other that he acquires new experiences. It is this struggle that fascinates him, that absorbs his interest. This "feedback" between sender and receiver, this dialogue, is the essence of vampyroteuthian art.

Within this artistic creation we are able to distinguish between several phases. (1) Vampyroteuthis goes through a particular experience. (2) He searches in his memory for a suitable model in order to capture it. (3) He verifies the absence of this model: the experience is as yet unexpressed. (4) This arresting experience goes beyond his organism, is organised by the brain and then transmitted to the chromatophores. (5) The chromatophores transcode the experience into a "skin painting". (6) Such colouration never before seen provokes the curiosity of another Vampyroteuthis. (7) The sender uses the new colouration to seduce the receiver and copulate with it. The result of this creative process is that henceforth there is a model to capture the inexpressed experience, and that this model is thereafter stored in the memory of the copulating mate. The acquired information

was thus incorporated into the vampyroteuthian dialogue and will remain there forever. This is because vampyroteuthian dialogue is eternal, as eternal as the genetic information stored in the egg.

A comparable creative process occurs when Vampyroteuthis does not make use of the chromatophores, but uses the sepia cloud to transmit acquired information. It would be misleading to think that a "feedback" between tentacles and sepia cloud is established in such a process, like the "feedback" between marble and fingers. This is not because the cloud is plastic and ephemeral, and marble permanent and hard. It is rather because the cloud is a vampyroteuthian secretion and marble is an object that is strange to man. The cloud does not fascinate Vampyroteuthis like marble fascinates man, because the cloud is not strange to him. As he models the cloud Vampyroteuthis is fascinated, just like man as he models marble. However, Vampyroteuthis is fascinated by the effect that the modelled cloud will have upon another Vampyroteuthis. His fascination is not objective but intersubjective.

Here is what happens during the modelling of the cloud. Vampyroteuthis goes through a particular experience, an adventure. His genetic information programmes him to secrete sepia in such dangerous situations. The same genetic information programmes him to model the cloud in such a fashion that the danger is directed against this cloud and not against him. Vampyroteuthis is genetically programmed to divert the enemy's intention. However, Vampyroteuthis reflects: as opposed to other less evolved octopi, he controls and re-programmes his own genetic programme in function of deliberate decisions. The experience that Vampyroteuthis has just gone through must be expressed in the cloud, no longer with the intention to divert a hypothetical aggressor, but to store this experience in the memory of another Vampyroteuthis. The cloud should not astound a hypothetical aggressor but should astound another

Vampyroteuthis with the intention of forcing him to store the experience. The cloud must "*épater les bourgeois*"[10] so that they remember what happened. The purpose of modelling the cloud is to divert the attention of the other Vampyroteuthis away from his intention, and to direct it towards the new information. So that other Vampyroteuthes are drawn towards the cloud and devour it thinking that they are devouring the sender of the message. Thenceforth the new information shall be incorporated into the vampyroteuthian dialogue forever by the method of deliberate deception, artifice and lies. "Art".

The vampyroteuthian creative process is a method through which new models of sensation, knowledge and value are articulated and transmitted to those who are violated to store them by seduction or lies. Vampyroteuthian art is a series of artifices, thanks to which the vampyroteuthian society is violated in order to admit particular models transmitted through the intermediation of ephemeral and despised objects. That is why there is neither "pure art", nor "pure science" or "pure politics" for Vampyroteuthis. Vampyroteuthis is always a "total artist", that is, one who seeks to attain immortality through the epistemological, aesthetic and ethical modelling of the other. He seeks his immortality by means of violence exerted upon the other. To him, science and politics are nothing but stratagems of art, nothing but traps. The aim is to inform the other, to alter him, to impose on him particular information, knowledge, behaviour and sensations. This is knowledge, behaviour and sensations that have been deliberated by the sender of the message. Vampyroteuthian art is total and totalitarian, because the raw materials are not objects but rather society. Vampyroteuthis is an artist that chisels into society to immortalise himself in it. The motive for vampyroteuthian creativity, for his search for immortality, is his spite for the other. That is why "art" is synonymous with "deceit".

To be sure, the vampyroteuthian creative process differs radically from the human. It is a different gesture and has a different purpose. However, its consideration provokes two opposing reactions. On one side, our own art shall reveal in its anti-vampyroteuthian aspects a less than flattering character. On the other side, in our own art we shall discover a clear tendency towards approximating the art of Vampyroteuthis. We can summarise this reaction with the following: inasmuch as human art diverges from vampyroteuthian art, it is a confused and undisciplined enterprise, and as human art acquires self-awareness and discipline, it moves towards a convergence with the art of Vampyroteuthis.

Men, as opposed to Vampyroteuthes, have "purity": pure art, pure science, pure social technique. However, from Vampyroteuthis' point of view, this purity will reveal itself to be dirt: the artist is pure when his existential interest stagnates in the path towards the other through the swamp of some dirty object (in stone, in sound, in linguistic syntax). The scientist is pure when his interest stagnates in the swamp of another dirty object (in phenomenon, in equation, in theory), and the social technician is pure when his existential interest manages to transform the other, towards whom he drives, into an object (of economy, of sociology, of politics), and this is the dirtiest of all objects. Therefore "purity" is a consequence of distracted interest, a perversion of interest. The artistic gesture reveals itself as an embarrassing gesture, as when a chicken pecks for grain when it doesn't know whether it should flee or attack the enemy. Human art is pure because it has forgotten its purpose, that of transmitting information to others so that they can store it.

However, men have started to become conscious of their forgetfulness. They have started to become aware that art history is a history of misunderstandings. They have started to do "communication theory" to make the artistic gesture more conscious and disciplined. The consequence of that is the communications revolution that is now underway which will restructure all human activity. Deep down, this revolution consists of a diversion of the existential interest stagnating in objects back towards the other. Our communicational structures are being fundamentally transformed, in the sense of becoming constituted by ephemeral and transient media that allow the other to be informed without the need for objects. It is as if humanity, after a multi-millennial turn through the objective world, had now reencountered the vampyroteuthian path. This vampyroteuthisation of our art deserves a closer look.

Before the industrial revolution every creative man was a craftsman, be it a blacksmith, cobbler, painter or poet. The post-industrial distinction between craftsman and artist was nonsensical: all of these creators imprinted information upon objects, whether iron, leather, canvass or letters. The object stored the information expressed within it; it was a "work of art" and the information stored was the "value" of the work. In this way the three concepts, information, value and artwork, were indistinguishable. Together they constituted "culture". The industrial revolution destroyed this concept of "culture". It invented a method of production that allowed information to be imprinted onto tools that imprint information upon objects. No longer blacksmith or cobbler, but now tools inform iron and leather, and the creative man is the toolmaker. It is the tool that stores the information and it is the tool that has value, and the object simply transmits the information from the tool. It is no longer a work of art, and its value becomes less and less. Object and value start to separate and the concept "work of art", and therefore of work, is diluted. The most enlightening example of this rupture in the concept of "culture" is provided by the printing press, a precursor to the whole industrial revolution. It is in the printing press and not in the printed book that the information is stored, and the value is in the manuscript and not in the book read, which acquires a pitiful value. The writer becomes toolmaker. Society did not realise, at the time, the impact of the industrial revolution upon the creative process, because art in the restricted modern sense of the term continued to be crafted, untouched by the new methods of production

since it was relegated to ghettos called "exhibitions and museums".

The second industrial revolution that is currently beginning constitutes a new reformulation of production methods: information is no longer stored in tools but in cybernetic programmes within apparatus that produce tools. Henceforth it is the programmer (the analyst and developer of systems) and not the toolmaker that informs. The apparatus will automatically imprint information upon tools, which will in turn automatically imprint the information upon countless objects. There emerges a tsunami of cheaper and cheaper gadgets that are pitiful for being banal, ephemeral stereotypes, carriers of diluted information: "mass culture". This is the culture of plastic pens, of pre-fabricated houses and of stereotyped political opinions. Programmed culture. Valueless culture because apparatus produce it automatically. The value and information are henceforth stored in the artificial memory of the apparatus. Therefore this inflationary tide of devalued objects leads to a disinterest in objects. Such objects no longer fascinate. It is no longer interesting to possess these objects. These are objects of mere consumption. That is, they are used until the information imprinted upon them is worn out, at which point they are thrown into the dustbin. Society's interest is increasingly diverted from objects towards information, which however is inaccessible to consumers. It is stored in the memory of apparatus and is transmitted, diluted, not only by the gadgets, but also and above all by the ephemeral channels of mass communication. In this way, the society of the immediate future shall be a society of information consumption, less and less interested in the consumption of "goods", of objects. The interest is diverted from economy to sociology. Intersubjective society: a society of Vampyroteuthes.

Man was, until recently, one who works. To work is to imprint information upon objects, "to transform the objective world". From now on this will be the work of apparatus. Men will no longer be workers and shall become information programmers and receivers. The "production moral" will disappear simultaneously with the "private property moral". A new moral shall emerge, one of elaboration and consumption of messages. Human existence will no longer realise itself in the struggle against objects, but in the struggle for preservation and transmission of acquired information. Men shall cease to be "workers" and become "functionaries of systems". Total artists functioning within programmed totalitarianism. Vampyroteuthes.

The most enlightening example of this new rupture in the concept of "culture" is provided by photography, an invention and precursor of the second revolution now underway. The individual photograph is a pitiful object of almost no value, an ephemeral stereotype easily replaceable. The value is in the information imprinted upon the photograph and it is stored in the prototype, the "negative". The photographic apparatus produces these prototypes automatically according to a specific programme contained within the apparatus. The photographer does not work, but rather functions within the apparatus' programme and re-programmes the apparatus. The purpose of the photographer is not to produce photographs, but to transmit information through photographs. What fascinates the photographer is not the photographic paper, the object, but the information to be transmitted. The photographic paper is for the photographer what the skin is for Vampyroteuthis: a medium for colourful messages.

Will then the vision of vampyroteuthian art necessarily be the vision of our own immediate future? Will the society of the future necessarily be a society of hatred, lies and the violation of the other through seduction and deception? There are reasons to state that such a future is probable but not inevitable. The difference between vampyroteuthian art and human art of the future is this: although we may come to despise the objective world as much as Vampyroteuthis despises it, although this world may become to us a mere collection of ephemeral communication channels just as it is for him, we emerge, as opposed to him, from a struggle against

objects that has taken tens of thousands of years. This struggle and the experiences acquired during it are stored in our memory but not in his. We have engaged in this struggle against objects in cooperation with all other men, and have emerged victorious only due to this cooperation. We still have stored in our memories the fact that initially, in the Palaeolithic Age, all men were constantly threatened by the objective world and were therefore obliged to unite against this world. In such a way that for us men the other is not merely an adversary to be violated and informed, but also an ally who creates information together with us. In fact, this memory of the primordial alliance slowly falls into oblivion under the impact of mass culture. However, this memory is still present and can help prevent us from transforming ourselves into heirs and transmitters of programmed information.

We can observe in Vampyroteuthis that information programming can dismiss the need for apparatus. The organism can function as an apparatus. The apparatus function can become "integrated". The apparatus-like behaviour can "overcome the apparatus". There can emerge a totalitarianism of integrated apparatus, therefore invisible and imperceptible. Just like the gelatinous mass of Vampyroteuthis. The contemplation of vampyroteuthian art prevents us therefore from glorifying the total work of art, the artificial, artifice and deception, so that we shall avoid every form of romanticism, because Vampyroteuthis illustrates the essence of romanticism: Hell.

V. The
Emergence of the Vampyroteuthis